Diff of Consciousness at dbdda47

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-Consciousness is a widely-misunderstood property of [[objects]]. Unlike [[descriptive properties]], which have empirically observable consequences and correlates, consciousness is a [[normative properties|normative property]] - an object is conscious if and inasmuch as it is [[bad]] to [[harm]], [[inconvenience]], [[kill]] or implode it. Arguments about whether things are or are not "conscious" are, as such, best interpreted as arguments about whether those things have [[moral worth]] rather than anything empirical.
+Consciousness is a widely-misunderstood property of [[objects]]. Unlike [[descriptive properties]], which have empirically observable consequences and correlates, consciousness is a [[normative properties|normative property]] - an object is conscious if and inasmuch as it is [[bad]] to [[harm]], [[inconvenience]], [[kill]] or implode it. Arguments about whether things are or are not "conscious" are, as such, best interpreted as arguments about whether those things have [[moral worth]] rather than anything empirical. Frequent references to the importance of consciousness are signalling of virtue and conscientiousness wrt. detecting possible allies.
 
-Twin studies in relativistic trolley collisions estimate that consciousness is responsible for about 30% of variance in moral worth.
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+Twin studies in relativistic trolley collisions estimate that consciousness is responsible for about 30% of variance in moral worth.
+
+== Incorrect, bad models
+
+=== Computationalism
+
+Consciousness is widely held to result from certain kinds of computation. For instance, [[https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799|integrated information theory]] holds that computations which "integrate information" are conscious. This neatly avoids various problems with other models. However, it has many flaws if considered in depth:
+
+* "Computations" aren't exactly a low-level physical property of the universe: the same systems can be interpreted as "computing" many different things.
+* This leads to a number of [[confusing]] scenarios - for example, a [[homomorphically encrypted]] computation may or may not be conscious, but this cannot be tested externally, creating moral problems.
+* There is also the problem of measuring "how much" consciousness is happening: for example, what happens if I run a conscious mind on a pair of computers in lockstep, and then disable one half? What if instead of disabling one half, it is instead subjected to slightly different stimuli?
+* "Incidental computations" by all kinds of systems should plausibly be creating consciousness in very strange scenarios. Why do we experience a rulebound, consistent, simple universe? See also [[Boltzmann brains]].
+* What if I represent my computable, conscious function as a very big lookup table?
+
+=== Dualism
+
+No.
+
+=== Physicalism
+
+It is likely that physics, as implemented by the [[universe]], can be simulated to arbitrary precision on a [[computer]]. This includes the parts of physics which conscious beings use. If consciousness is determined by physical hardware, then that physics can thus be simulated on a computer and will behave identically (or at least up to thermal noise limits, with enough simulation precision) to the physical version. Either this is not possible - physics is not computable - or consciousness is [[epiphenomenal]], which is bad, or consciousness is generated by computation of some form.
+
+=== Julian Jaynes
+
+== Incorrect, funny models
+
+* God endows sufficiently parameterized [[neural nets]] with a soul.
+* Consciousness is a culturally transmitted phenomenon inherited from crows.
+* Consciousness is the inelegant global [[mutex]] of the mind ([[distributed systems design]] is hard).
+* Consciousness is proportional to baryon number.
+* Due to compute limitations, consciousness was shut down in 1971.
+* Consciousness is an ugly hack used by compute-limited agents which allows them to connect their world model to their own observations ("[[https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ethRJh2E7mSSjzCay/building-phenomenological-bridges|phenomenological bridge]]").
+* Chinese-speaking computers cannot be conscious (Chinese Room argument).
+* Consciousness scales with parameter count (but in a non-soul-related way).
+* Consciousness is fully epiphenomenal - discussions of consciousness is illusory.
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